In this paper, we examine how the decisions of churches are impacted by the decisions of rival churches. Using a novel data set of Christian churches in two suburban Nashville, TN counties, we estimate a model of strategic interaction, based on empirical models of discrete games, which accounts for the location and denomination of churches. We focus on a church's decision of whether to provide a weekday child care program. Empirical evidence indicates that churches compete more strongly with nearby same-denomination churches than with different-denomination churches. These effects diminish with distance. Using our estimates, we conduct counterfactual simulations to examine the impact of an increase in the number of church adherents, the number of preschool aged children, and we also remove for-profit providers from the sample.
Introduction
Religious congregations provide a wide variety of services to local communities. They provide aid for those in need, coordinate social activities, and provide child care, along with many other service activities. The wide variety of services that churches offer has the ability to address community needs and benefit a large number of individuals. 1 While the benefit of these services is difficult to quantify, prior studies find that religious involvement is correlated with greater life expectancy (McCullough et al., 2000) and higher incomes (Gruber, 2005) .
Though causality cannot be proven, this at least suggests that churches generate social benefits, which could be related to the services they provide. Access to many church-provided services is not limited strictly to church members and the benefits extend to non-members in the community at-large, particularly when churches address community needs not met by other organizations.
Given the large (and varied) roles that churches play in local communities, it is somewhat surprising how infrequently economists have studied the behaviors and choices of churches themselves. 2 The relatively small amount of research on church behavior is at least partially data driven, since many forms of charitable giving are informal and unobservable, making the benefits resulting from church-sponsored services difficult to quantify. In addition, churches may have different motivations and considerations in entering the market for services than do other organizations. It is often the case that local governments and for-profit firms offer what 1 We recognize that not all religious congregations refer to themselves as a "church." However, this is the common convention for our sample of Christian churches. We refer to religious congregations as "churches" for brevity. 2 A recent EconLit keyword search for "church" yielded 310 results, while a keyword search for "airline" revealed 826 results in peer-reviewed journals. appear to be close substitutes for the services offered by churches. However, it is difficult to determine if individuals regard these alternatives as substitutes for church-sponsored services.
Further, it is unclear whether churches are providing a service to meet an unserved need in the community, to generate profits, or instead to match services with other churches in order to attract members. Together these unique features make the decisions of churches to offer services an interesting area for economic research.
In this paper, we set out to formally model the behavior of Christian churches by examining the decision of whether to provide a weekday child care program (either a full-time or "mother's day out" part-time day care program). 3 We specify a model, based on empirical models of discrete games, that allows church payoffs to depend on the decisions of rival churches. 4 The model incorporates unique features of church decisions by allowing the degree of interdependence between any two churches to depend on the denomination of each church and the distance between the churches' locations. We seek to measure whether there is any evidence of strategic interaction between churches.
We choose to consider the decision to offer a child care program for several reasons. First, church-sponsored child care plays a large role in the market and the benefits of the service extend well beyond the members of a church. A National Council of Churches (NCC) study in the early 1980s found that Christian churches were the single-largest provider of child care services in the U.S. (Lindner et al., 1983) . Second, the decision to offer child care is easier to observe and quantify than other services that churches may provide. Third, the choice to 3 The decision to focus on Christian churches, as opposed to including all types of religious congregations, is empirically-motivated. More on this will be discussed in Section 4. 4 The term "rival" should not be read to imply hostility. We simply use the term to acknowledge that, for example, the desire to increase the congregation size is, to a large degree, a zero-sum game.
offer child care involves substantial time costs of planning, as well as explicit costs for labor, capital, and physical space making this decision a good candidate for the study of strategic interactions.
To conduct our study, we construct a unique data set of all Christian churches in two suburban Nashville, Tennessee counties. We collect a rich set of church characteristics using published works, online resources, and telephone calls. In addition, we conduct physical inspections of each church and record numerous observable characteristics about the features of the church buildings and property. Together these sources allow us to compile a detailed set of characteristics for each church, which is unavailable through other sources.
Our results support the basic hypothesis that a church's decisions are affected by the decisions of other churches. Churches are strategic substitutes, meaning that, holding all else constant, a church is less likely to provide child care if a nearby church offers it. Further, we find strong evidence that a church's response to the decision of another nearby church to offer day care service depends crucially on the denomination of the rival. If the nearby rival shares the same denomination as the potential entrant, the impact is substantially larger than if the nearby rival is a different-denomination church. Interestingly, for-profit centers appear to have minimal impact on church child care decisions. All strategic effects diminish as geographic distance increases.
Our estimates also indicate that the number of denomination-specific adherents in a location, defined as a count of the number of individuals identifying themselves as followers of a specific denomination, has a large impact on the profitability of a church-run day care. 5 Note that adherents is different than church members. The number of adherents captures the "pool" of Although we do not estimate a model of household child care decisions, the importance (in the child care provision decision) of a church's adherent population size provides some evidence that, perhaps, families have a preference for sending their children to a day care run by their favored religious denomination. This also provides a plausible interpretation for the strong same-denomination strategic effects. Interestingly, the overall population size is far less important in a church's child care decision than the number of adherents to a church's denomination.
We also conduct counterfactual simulations to characterize the impact that an increase in the number of preschool aged children, an increase the number of congregation adherents, and the impact of the absence of for-profit providers in the market have on the equilibrium number of day care providers. Each of these appear to increase the number of day care providers as expected. Increased church adherents have a notably larger impact than increased preschool aged children. The exclusion of for-profit providers has a negligible effect on the total number of non-profit centers, but appears to impact which churches choose to offer care.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section contains a brief review of relevant research in the economic literature relating to churches and the empirical models of discrete games. The empirical model is presented in Section 3 and the data used in this study are described in Section 4. We present our estimation strategy in Section 5.
Estimates and counterfactual simulations are presented in Section 6 and Section 7 concludes. individuals in a given area following a particular branch of Christianity (Southern Baptist, Methodist, etc.). This is a location characteristic, similar to Census population estimates, rather than a church characteristic.
Literature Review
There are two strands of literature to discuss in relation to this study: the literature on the economic behavior of religious organizations and churches and the empirical literature on estimating models of discrete games.
Literature on Religion & Economics
Most of the economic studies of religion focus on the behavior of individual church members.
McCullough et al. (2000) present a meta-analysis of studies that investigate whether religious people live longer than their non-religious counterparts. They find that religious involvement is associated with lower mortality rates. Gruber (2005) looks at the impact religiosity has on economic outcomes for church members and finds, for example, that religious participation is positively related to a higher level of income. Gruber and Hungerman (2008) look at the effect of repealing laws that prohibited retail activity on Sunday had on the behavior of individuals.
They find that the likelihood of drinking and drug use increased in churchgoers following the repeal of these so-called "blue laws." Another branch of the religion literature has focused on external factors relating to church charitable giving. Gruber and Hungerman (2007) and Hungerman (2009) examine whether government expansion has crowded out faith-based charity and find evidence of crowding-out particularly in homogenous communities.
Relative to the number of studies relating individuals' outcomes to their church attendance, very few economic studies focus on the behavior of the church itself or how such behavior is influenced by the actions of other churches. Two studies suggest a link between charitable giving and competition between churches. Zaleski and Zech (1995) investigate how competition between churches affects the amount of money members contribute to their church. They find that Protestants give more when their congregation faces substantial competition whereas Catholics give more when their church represents a minority in a heavily concentrated market. Zaleski and Zech conjecture that this finding is likely due to each church improving their product due to competition but, they are unable to formally test this hypothesis. Pepall et al. (2006) look at church spending on charitable services (soup kitchens, etc.) and find that churches give more to these charitable services when faced with increased inter-and intra-denominational competition. They conclude that charitable service spending is one of the mechanisms by which churches compete. Walrath (2008) , to our knowledge, is the only other paper to use empirical discrete game techniques to examine church behavior. Walrath looks at the entry decisions of churches with the goal of determining whether there is "over entry" of Protestant churches in different geographic areas, due to the (relative) lack of a strong hierarchical structure (such as with the Catholic Church).
Empirical Models of Discrete Games
The empirical strategy used in this paper to model church behavior originates with Bresnahan and Reiss (1990) and Berry (1992) . In Berry, a reduced-form profit function is used in a latent variable approach to identify the impact of demographic characteristics and the actions of rival firms on an airline's decision of which markets to enter. We extend this basic framework by incorporating elements from Seim (2006) and Dai (2007) . Seim, in examining the entry and location choices of video rental stores, allowed each agent's profit to depend not just on the entry decisions of others, but also on their chosen location. From a modeling standpoint, this was done by allowing the profit of agent  (conditional upon entry) to depend on the number of other entrants within  miles from agent 's location. In this manner, the estimated impact of a competitor two miles away, for example, may differ from the impact of a competitor eight miles away. As shown in Section 3, we will utilize a similar strategy. In Dai's (2007) study on cell phone entry choices, the number of other competitors/entrants matters, but so too does their identity. In this context, Dai allows the profit of Cingular, for example, to be affected differently by Sprint or Verizon's entry into the market. Dai is able to estimate these firm-specific parameters because she observes each firm's entry decision in over 19,000 cities. We, on the other hand, observe only one equivalent "entry" decision per church, which makes following Dai's approach infeasible. In order to incorporate the basic premise behind Dai's modeling assumption, however, we allow the impact of competitor churches to differ depending on whether they belong to the same denomination or not. In this manner, we are able to incorporate information regarding spatial distances, as in Seim (2006), and allow for at least a small degree of heterogeneity in the effect of others' decisions.
In models of this type, it is likely that games may result in multiple equilibria. This necessitates either the use of a selection rule or the adoption of an estimation strategy, such as Ciliberto and Tamer (2009) , that involves finding the set of parameters that satisfy the specified equilibrium conditions rather than defining an equilibrium selection rule. It is not feasible to adopt Ciliberto and Tamer's strategy for our single-market data set. 6 We, therefore, rely on an equilibrium selection rule, which is discussed in greater detail in Section 6 We provide a greater explanation for this infeasibility in Section 3.2.
3.2.
3 Empirical Model
Model Setup
Each church  faces a decision of whether to offer a weekday child care program. We assume that churches make their decisions in order to maximize a value function. In following the common convention in the literature on empirical models of discrete games (Berry, 1992;  Mazzeo, 2002; Cohen et al., 2010), we assume a reduced-form value function for each church.
The proper objective function for nonprofits is the subject of some prior research, including
Harrison and Lybecker (2005). The reduced-form value function is appealing for studying church decisions because it allows us to be agnostic about what the value function actually is (profit or revenue maximization, membership size maximization, etc.). Our assumption does, however, require that all churches are optimizing the same objective function. 7 For convenience, we interchangeably use the terms "objective function" and "profit function."
We now consider the functional form of church 's profit function.
The value that church  receives from offering child care is a function of observed and unobserved (to the econometrician) profit-shifters, as well as the child care decisions of rival churches. Church 's general profit function can be written:
where   is a vector of observable characteristics and profit-shifters for church ,  () is a function that relates the child care decisions of other churches ( − ) to the profitability of church 's child care decision, and   captures unobserved factors that affect church .
The vectors  and  are parameters to be estimated. For notational simplicity, we refer to  = { } as the set of parameters to estimate.
The function  ( −  ) captures the impact that rival churches have on church 's payoff.
In order to allow for some heterogeneity in the manner in which rival churches affect church , we estimate separate 's based on each church's denomination. More specifically, let ∆ − denote the set of churches of the same denomination as , but excluding , and let Ω  denote the set of churches belonging to a different denomination. In our estimation, we consider the following specification for  ():
In equation (2) we adopt a distance band approach.   indexes the decisions of churches of the same denomination as church  located within distance band  from church  and   indexes the decisions of churches of different denominations located within distance band  from church . We include three different distance bands: (i) between 0 and 4 miles,
(ii) between 4 miles and 8 miles, and (iii) between 8 miles and 12 miles. 8 By estimating separate   coefficients, we are again able to distinguish between the impact of same-and different-denomination churches.
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  is included in equation (1) to account for unobserved factors and characteristics that affect the profitability of church 's child care decision. Given the spatial and organizational nature of the data, it seems inappropriate to assume (or require) that the unobservables are independent across churches. In order to allow for correlation, we decompose   as follows:
where   is a denomination-specific unobservable,   is a city-specific unobservable,
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  is a denomination-city specific unobservable, and   represents 's idiosyncratic benefit from providing child care. We assume that each of the four unobservables (   ) are distributed i.i.d. standard normal. Although these unobservables are assumed to be independent, our specification allows the unobserved profitability between any two churches to be correlated based on a common denomination, a common location, or a combination of both.
Equilibrium
The equilibrium condition in our model is that, conditional upon the decisions of all other churches, church  will only offer child care if the value of doing so is greater than zero. More formally, the equilibrium (binary) decision for church  may be written:
where () is an indicator function taking the value one if the value of the church's objective function is positive, given the strategies of the other churches. It is well-known that multiple equilibria are probable in games of this type (see, for example, Hartmann, 2009). One possible solution to this problem is to utilize an equilibrium selection rule that will identify a single equilibrium. Bajari et al. (2004) argue that the equilibrium that maximizes total joint profits is the one most likely to occur, whereas Berry (1992) adopts a timing assumption that ensures a unique equilibrium prediction.
We consider four plausible selections rules for our data and let the fit of the model determine which is our preferred rule. The first selection rule assumes churches make their child care decision sequentially based on the age of each church. The order is determined by the number of years each church has been in existence with the oldest church moving first.
Our second rule selects a unique equilibrium based on maximizing total denomination profits.
More specifically, we use an iterative procedure to search for a stable equilibrium in which each denomination selects the child care configuration that maximizes total denomination profits, subject to the strategies of the other denominations. The third selection rule utilizes a sequential selection mechanism based on the likely need for child care in a given location.
More specifically, we construct an index for each church based on the local demographics (population, preschool aged children, married couples, and dual-income households). We posit that these characteristics should positively influence a church's decision to offer child care, giving our index the interpretation of reflecting the churches we might expect to be located in the areas where demand for child care services is highest. The fourth selection rule is motivated by Bajari et al. (2004)'s finding that the most likely equilibrium to occur is that which maximizes total joint profits. We, therefore, consider a selection rule in which the equilibrium maximizing total church profits is chosen.
While these selection rules may simplify the estimation and discussion of results, one downside of such an approach is that the resulting parameter estimates are dependent on the precise equilibrium selection rule chosen. A potential solution to the assumption of a specific equilibrium selection rule is to estimate sets of parameters -as opposed to point estimates -that are consistent with specified equilibrium conditions. Ciliberto and Tamer (2009) propose a method to estimate these parameter sets. In this manner, estimation does not depend on an equilibrium selection rule, although point estimates of  are not possible.
Unfortunately, implementing Ciliberto and Tamer's estimation strategy is not feasible in our case. The first stage in Ciliberto and Tamer's estimation strategy involves obtaining a consistent estimate of the probability of observing any possible market configuration. Whether done parametrically, using the multinomial logit (Cohen et al., 2010), or non-parametrically (Ciliberto and Tamer, 2009) this essentially requires using variation in local market characteristics (demographics) to explain observed variation in local market structure. This necessitates the observation of multiple geographic markets. It is difficult with our data, in which churches in certain locations certainly "compete" against churches which may be located in a different city or county, to think of defining numerous distinct geographic markets. Realistically, all churches in our sample belong to a single market 11 , making Ciliberto-Tamer ill suited for our data. County. The collection of church characteristics presents a difficult challenge as there is no comprehensive database of information on local churches. We obtained the listing of churches and information on each church's characteristics via internet searches, telephone calls, and 11 In order to be thorough, even ignoring our belief that the data constitute a single geographic market, we nevertheless used a GPS graph to divide the counties into distinct markets. We were able to construct 22 different "markets." To see why this exercise is insufficient, consider a simplified world in which each market contained a church from the five most popular denominations in our data. This would imply there are 32 (= 2finally physical visual inspections of each church in our sample. 13 In order to determine the membership size of each church, we first contacted the local governing body of each denomination and then attempted to contact each church by telephone to confirm the membership size. 14 We were successfully able to gather self-reported membership data for 256 (60 percent) of the churches. 15 We used these reported membership figures, along with the other observed characteristics (described in greater detail below), to impute congregation sizes for the churches with missing values. We then used these figures for congregation sizes to categorize each church as being small (fewer than 75 families), medium (between 75 and 300 families), or large (more than 300 families). 16 We were able to construct our child care measure using a variety of different sources. 17 We consulted church websites and state child-care licensing lists, where applicable. We looked 13 We began using telephone book/yellow page listings. We supplemented this list using the listing of churches available through the HomeTownLocator R°G azetteer (http://www.hometownlocator.com), a website specializing in providing "local information" and through Google searches. We made physical inspection of all churches on our list, which lead us to encounter a number of churches that were not on our initial list.
14 The local associations of Southern Baptist and United Methodist churches graciously provided us with access to the membership numbers for their churches. A local minister of a Church of Christ provided us with Royster (2009) which contains the membership sizes. 15 Most of the churches that we were unable to contact are very small congregations and are unlikely to offer services such as day care. Approximately 70 percent of these were categorized in our visual inspections as having small church buildings. In addition, only 8 percent of the churches that provide child care programs had missing membership information. 16 We transform membership numbers into three general size categories for three main reasons. First, because a child care program may attract new members to the church, there is a concern that membership size may be an endogenous characteristic. By transforming membership numbers into categories (meant to account for the number of families potentially utilizing child care, as well as the level of resources available to begin the child care program), we believe that this minimizes the potential endogeneity. Second, not all churches record membership in the same manner. Some record the total number of registered individuals, others count the number of registered families, and others record only the actual attendance. Since all three measures are transformed into a single count of families, we believe the broad categories also reduce measurement error to some extent. Finally, using general size categories minimizes any likely measurement error due to the imputation of some size values. 17 We consider offering day care service to mean offering either full-time or part-time care during the normal business week. We do not count churches that only offer child care during church services or short term "Vacation Bible School" programs.
for signage indicating child care programs during our physical inspections and, when the results were inconclusive, we followed up with telephone inquiries to the church.
An important element in our model is the notion of same and different denominations.
Denominations and affiliations are often part of a church's name, in other cases these were determined over the telephone. If a church did not claim to be affiliated with a denomination or if the denomination could not be determined, the church is classified as part of our "Other Christian" category. 18 Records from the Williamson County Assessor of Property and the Rutherford County Property Assessor allowed us to determine the age of the church, as well as the dates of church building renovations or additions. We used this data to create a variable indicating whether the church was built or remodeled in the past 10 years. Remaining church characteristics were compiled from our visual inspections. While some of these measures, such as the presence of a playground or athletic field on church property, are objective, others are, admittedly, more subjective in nature. We also categorized the physical size of the church building into one of three size categories. These detailed descriptions provide an accurate picture of the overall impression projected by each church to the community that is impossible to quantify with a single variable. We acknowledge the obvious downside of using subjective measures, but the lack of quantitative data on these churches forces us to improvise as best we can.
Summary statistics for the church data appear in Table 1 below. 19 18 This category includes all churches that cannot be categorized in our other denominations. We establish a unique category for a denomination if there are at least four churches in the denomination. Denominations which have fewer than four churches are categorized in this "other" category. 19 We collected data on numerous other church features such as the presence of landscaping, church signs, bus or van service, stained glass, and paved parking lots among others. We suppress these from the tables for space considerations.
INSERT TABLE 1
As reported in Table 1 , almost one quarter of the churches in our sample are some form of Baptist, with Other Christian and Church of Christ being the second and third most common church types, respectively. Fifty-nine of the churches (14 percent) offer a child-care program and 83 percent of the churches with a program offer only part-time care. These programs are often marketed as part-time "Mother's Day Out" or "Preschool" programs. The minimum number of families reported for a church in our sample is 6 and the maximum is 3,000. 20 As mentioned above, these family membership size measures map into the size categories on the right-hand side of Table 1 . From Table 1 (continued), we see that approximately 30 percent of the churches are either less than 10 years old or have been refurbished or remodeled in the past 10 years ("New building"). 21 
Location Characteristics
From the addresses we were able to determine the geographic coordinates for each church, which allows us to calculate the distances between churches and compile information about each church's geographic area. These characteristics represent location-specific factors which influence the demand or payoff for day care. From the 2000 Census, we gather (at the Census block group level) median household income, population, the percentage of the population under five, the percentage of married adults, and the percentage of dual income households. 20 For completeness we include all churches in the two counties. Churches that serve a small number of families are unlikely to have the resources required to offer child care or other services. Their inclusion, if anything, would weaken our ability to observe strategic interactions. 21 This seems to be a higher-than-anticipated percentage. This is probably due to the fact that the metropolitan Nashville area is one of the faster-growing areas of the country.
Using the Census block group data, we construct totals for the four mile radius circle surrounding each church. 22 It is important to note that, although these Census variables can be considered "market" variables, the manner in which they were constructed allows these characteristics to be considered church-specific.
In addition to these general demographic characteristics, we consider a number of other church-specific profit-shifters. The Association of Statisticians of American Religious Bodies (ASARB) conducts a decennial study on membership in 149 different religious denominations. This study produces, for each county in the U.S., denomination-specific adherence rates that represent the number of adherents each denomination has (per thousand in the population). We assume that the adherents of any given denomination are distributed across each Census block group in proportion to the population of each block group. In this manner, as with the Census demographic data discussed above, we are able to construct a churchspecific measure that captures the total number of adherents church  has within four miles of their location. The number of adherents should not be confused with the number of church members. The number of adherents is measured as the number of people identifying themselves as followers of a particular denomination. Two neighboring churches, which may be identical in terms of observed local Census demographics, may differ in their likelihood of offering child care because of differences in the number of nearby adherents.
We also include a variable that is defined as the number of workers employed within four miles of each church. This worker count, which is calculated using Traffic Analysis Zone (TAZ) data complied by the Census, is a measure of the non-residential population in a 22 We do this by determining the geographic center of each Census block group and then including those block groups for which the center coordinates fall within the four mile radius circle from a given church.
given area. If parents base child care decisions on their work location, as opposed to their home location, then this may capture some of that effect.
Finally, because a church's decision may be influenced by the availability of full time forprofit child care, we include two measures that address the availability and substitutability of for-profit care: (i) the distance to the closest for-profit child care center and (ii) the total capacity -measured by the number of children -of for-profit child care centers within four miles of a given church. Records of the locations and capacities of all licensed for-profit day care centers in the two sample counties come from the Tennessee Department of Human Services child care locator (http://www.ja.state.tn.us/accweb).
By proposing these for-profit measures as suitable profit-shifters, we are implicitly making the argument that it is appropriate to treat them as exogenous. Our assumption, therefore, is that church choices do not impact the decisions of for-profit child care centers. We believe this assumption is reasonable for our data. For-profit child care centers differ substantially from church-run child care centers in terms of pricing and quantity (hours per day, days per week). In order for us to empirically support such a claim, we collected information on the prices and hours of operation for all church-run and for-profit child care centers in the sample counties. Summary statistics for this information appears in an appendix.
INSERT TABLE 2
Summary statistics for geographic/location characteristics are found in Table 2 . The mean distance to the nearest different-denomination church is 0.61 miles and the mean distance to a same-denomination church is 2.56 miles. The mean number of for-profit day care centers within a four mile radius is approximately eleven.
Estimation
We use a method of simulated moments (MSM) estimator, similar to that used by Dai (2007) .
We depart in several ways, however, due primarily to the fact that we observe decisions for only one geographic market. The key to any such estimation procedure is that we must be able to solve for the predicted equilibrium for observed and unobserved characteristics and parameter values. Our method of moments estimator, in the most general terms, searches for parameter values that make our predicted equilibrium as "close" as possible to the observed equilibrium.
Our model contains four unobservable terms (   ) and, for tractability, we have chosen to use simulation methods. As the initial step in estimation, we take  standard normal draws for each of our unobservables. 23 Notice that there are 424 churches so our matrix of random draws for  will be (424 × ) but we partition the sample into 8 cities which implies that the matrix of random draws for  will be (8 × ). Once we have made the requisite set of draws, we construct the single unobserved index variable (  ) for each church, as outlined in equation (3). The resulting matrix   is a (424 × ) set of random draws for each church.
For each set of random draws, we then use equations (1) and (4), along with a selection rule, to find the predicted equilibrium. We proceed to do this for each of the  random draws 23 In our estimation, we set  = 400, although we will keep the notation general.
and then compute the relevant moment conditions (which are discussed in greater detail below). Defining b  as the column vector of residuals from our moment conditions, we repeat the above steps in order to minimize our objective function: b  0  b , where  is a weighting matrix. As is commonly done in method of moments estimation, we estimate the model in a two-stage procedure. In the first stage, we estimate the parameters b  using an initial weighting matrix, assumed to be an identity matrix. We then use these initial estimates ( b ) to construct an estimate of the optimal weighting matrix c  , where c
The model is then re-estimated using the estimated optimal weighting matrix. Reported coefficients reflect the parameter estimates from the second-stage estimation.
In our MSM estimation, we use the following moment conditions: (1) Given that all 424 churches in our sample make a binary decision, there are 2 424 candidate equilibria to consider. Even with the most advanced computing power, evaluating each of these combinations is infeasible. We, therefore, restrict our analysis to outcomes in which the total number of churches providing child care falls between 45 and 75. 24 6 Results
Coefficient Estimates
The estimates of our model are presented in Table 3 . Our primary focus is on the competitive effects, though we also include the coefficients for variables which shift the demand for churchsponsored day care. The top row of Table 3 displays the function values which measure the goodness-of-fit of the various selection rules. For ease of exposition, the columns in Table 3 (selection rules) have been sorted according to objective function value. The selection rule providing the best fit is the rule of sequential choice based on age presented in column 1.
Column 2 presents results obtained using maximizing denomination-specific total profits as the selection rule, and column 3 displays parameter estimates for our selection rule based on an index of location characteristics. The selection rule based on maximizing total church profits presented in column 4 yields the worst fit.
INSERT TABLE 3
The parameter estimates in Table 3 show clear evidence of strategic interaction between churches. The strength of the effect depends crucially on both the denomination of, and the distance to the rival. We generally find that  1  0 and  2  0 under each selection rule.
The impact on the entry decision is largest for nearby churches and the magnitude of the 24 Using our paramter estimates, we examine the frequency with which each total number of child care providers is predicted to be an equilibrium. A selection of these results is presented in Table 4 . We find that combinations of less than 47 churches or more than 70 churches are never identified as equilibria.
impact is substantially larger for same denomination versus different denomination churches.
First, consider the effects in the narrowest distance band. Row two of Table 3 indicates that church-sponsored day care of the same-denomination within a distance of 4 miles has a negative and statistically significant impact on entry under all four selection rules at the 5 percent level or better. Row 3 indicates that day cares operated by a different denomination within 4 miles also have a negative affect though the magnitude and statistical significance are smaller. Different denomination churches have a significant impact at the 5 percent level for the age-based selection rule and at the 10 percent level in the total profits selection rule.
The impact of the closest different denomination churches is negative, but not statistically significant under the other selection rules.
Consistent with intuition, the impact of other churches diminishes with distance. The estimates in Table 3 , row 4, show a negative effect for same denomination churches in the 4 to 8 mile distance band. The magnitude of each estimate in row 4 is less than half of the corresponding estimate for the closest churches in row 2. The negative impact from same denomination churches is statistically significant at the 10 percent level in columns 1, 2, and 4 and not statistically significant at conventional levels in column 3. The estimates in row 4 indicate that the impact of same denomination churches in the range of 4 to 8 miles from the church has roughly the same impact as different denomination churches within a 4 mile radius in row 3. The effect for different denomination churches within 4 to 8 miles is small in magnitude and not statistically significant. None of the estimated impacts are statistically significant in the 8 to 12 mile distance band.
The fact that results in Table 3 differ by selection rule provides some interesting insights.
The selection rule which maximizes denomination profits (column 2) indicates the largest negative impact from same denomination entrants in the two smallest distance bands and does not find a significant impact from different denominations. This is not surprising given that other denomination's actions are taken as exogenous. The selection rule based on maximizing total joint profits of all churches (column 4) produces the smallest magnitude for the impact of same denomination churches on entry. The estimated impact is half as large as the estimated impact for maximized denomination profits. Maximizing denominationspecific total profits in column 2 performs notably better than equilibrium selection based on maximization of (overall) total profits. This is interesting because, with the exception of certain denominations such as Catholic, most of the denominations in our sample have a very weak or non-existent hierarchical structure. Perhaps this is further evidence that the "competition" is truly an intra-denominational one. Table 3 also displays the impact of church characteristics on church entry decisions. As compared to medium-sized churches, small churches are less likely to provide child care and large churches are more likely to provide child care. The estimates for large churches are positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent level across all selection rules. The estimates for small churches are negative and are statistically significant at the 10 percent level for the age, denomination profits, and total profits selection rules. This seems reasonable given that larger churches are likely to have both more families interested in child care and a resource advantage over smaller churches.
Newer churches are more likely to offer child care and the effect is statistically significant at the 1 percent level under all selection rules. Similarly, churches in areas with more congregation adherents are more likely to offer child care. This effect is significant at the 1 percent level in columns 1, 3 and 4 and at the 5 percent level in column 2. The percentage of population under 5 years of age has a positive impact on entry. The impact is statistically significant at the 5 percent level in column 3, and at the 10 percent level in columns 1 and 2. In column 1, for-profit capacity has a negative impact and distance to for-profit has a positive impact on entry with both effects significant at the 10 percent level. None of the other church or location parameter estimates are statistically significant.
Simulations
Using our parameter estimates, we consider the likely impact of a 20% increase in the number of adherents (for each church) and, separately, a 20% increase in the proportion of the preschool-aged population. These constitute two main predictors of profitability that are independent of church decisions. In addition we also consider the impact of eliminating the for-profit centers from the market. The simulation is based on the equilibrium selection rule based on church age, which had the best goodness-of-fit. These results are presented in Table   4 .
INSERT TABLE 4
Each column in Table 4 reports values averaged over 400 random draws from the set of unobservables. 25 We present our results in this manner since we only have one market for analysis. The first column, which characterizes our observed sample forms the baseline 25 These are the same set of random draws used in the estimation procedure.
model. In columns 2 through 4, each of the three demand shifters leads to an increase in the expected number of providers, relative to the baseline prediction. This change is largest for the 20 percent increase in congregation adherents.
The effect of removing for-profit centers from the market is of interest. The distance to the nearest for-profit center seems to have a significant impact on entry in the estimates presented in Table 3 (at least for our preferred set of estimates). However, when for-profit centers are removed (Table 4 , column 4) the impact of their omission is slight. There is only a marginal impact on the expected number of church child care centers. We see that removing the for-profits does increase the likelihood that nearby churches will offer child care. However, the fact that nearby non-profits are more likely to offer child care reduces the likelihood that churches far from the for-profits will offer child care. In the baseline model, the average distance that each church child care provider is from the closest for-profit is 2.053 miles. In the No For-Profit Providers counterfactual, the average distance each church child care provider is from the closest for-profit location is 1.798. 26 To summarize, roughly the same number of churches would offer child care, although the location mix would change.
Such changes clearly have an impact on family welfare, although calculating the change in family welfare is beyond the scope of this paper.
Conclusions & Extensions
The prevalence of church-sponsored activities along with the unique features underlying their decisions make the strategic behavior of churches an interesting area of study. We use a unique, hand-collected data set to formally model the decisions of churches in a discrete game structure to further our limited knowledge of the strategic behavior of churches.
Our model incorporates both the identity (i.e. denomination) and the location of our churches. We use the model to test for the existence of strategic interactions between churches in the decision of whether to provide a weekday child care program. Our results find evidence of strategic interactions between churches. A church is significantly less likely to offer child care services if a nearby same-denomination church offers child care. The presence of a nearby different-denomination, or for-profit day care also has a negative impact on a church's entry decision but the magnitude of their impact is much lower.
One of the primary predictors of profitability for a church day care is the number of congregation adherents that live nearby. The number of adherents has a larger impact than other demographic characteristics, suggesting that the religious affiliation of the provider represents an important consideration in this portion of the child care market. This pattern also suggests a plausible explanation for our finding that same-denomination churches have a greater impact on child care decisions. When a nearby, same-denomination day care is present, it reduces the pool of potential children for a day care perhaps because some families prefer all else equal to send their children to a day care run by their own denomination.
This study is one of the first to explicitly model the choices and behaviors of churches. The results highlight the existence of strategic interactions between churches and demonstrate that a church's response to a rival's choice to offer a service depends crucially on whether the rival is of the same or of a different denomination. These findings indicate unique considerations underlying church decisions and suggest plenty of opportunities for further study on church behavior.
A Appendix
A.1 For-Profit Child Care Providers
We obtained information about the cost and hours of operation for all the child care centers in the two county area (for-profit and church-run). Price information was typically not available through a center's website, regardless of their non-profit status. Therefore, all information was collected by directly contacting the centers and inquiring about hours of operation and costs. These calls were made during the first two weeks of May 2010. Table 1A presents summary statistics for the characteristics of for-profit and church-run child care centers. The summary statistics demonstrate that each is operating in a very different market. All but one of the for-profit centers offer full-time care, but only 17 percent of the church-run programs offer a full-time option. On average for-profit centers operate five days a week for about 11 hours a day. Church-run programs generally operate two or three days a week for only five hours a day. The cost is also quite different with for-profit centers charging almost $50 per day versus less than $20 for church sponsored programs. Even after accounting for the large difference in hours of operation, the mean hourly rate is $0.68 and the median hourly rate is $1.16 per hour higher at for-profit centers. It does not appear that the two types of day care providers are particularly close substitutes for one another.
INSERT Notes: *** -significant at the 1% level, ** -significant at the 5% level, * -significant at the 10% level 
